We study a market where k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n > k bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world. The good that is auctioned is a common-value object for the bidders and a bidder's valuation for the object is determined jointly by the state of the world and an action that he chooses after winning the object but before he observes the state. We show that there are equilibria where the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of the world and aggregates no information even in an arbitrarily large auction. In the equilibrium that we construct, because prices do not aggregate information, agents have strict incentives to acquire costly information before they participate in the market. Also, market statistics other than price, such as, the amount of rationing and bid distributions contain extra information about the state. Our findings sharply contrast with past work which shows that large auctions aggregate information when there is no ex-post action.
Introduction
Prices are commonly thought to reflect market participants' expectations concerning unknown economic fundamentals. Whether this view is justified is a central question in economics. More specifically, whether prices efficiently aggregate information which is dispersed among agents that are active in an economy is a question that has been frequently addressed by previous researchers. A large common-value auction is an example of a market where information, dispersed among bidders, is effectively aggregated by the price. In particular, if bidders in a uniform-price auction each have an independent signal about the unknown state of the world and if the unknown state determines the common value of the identical objects which are being auctioned, then the equilibrium auction price converges to the true value of the object as the number of objects and the number of bidders in the auction grow arbitrarily large. Therefore, the auction price reveals information about the unknown state of the world. And this remarkable result holds under quite general assumptions.
See, Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) as well as Wilson (1977) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) .
None of the past work that explores information aggregation in auctions, however, articulates how the information, revealed by the auction price, is used. In this paper we instead explicitly model how the information about the state of the world is used after a common-value auction is completed: the auction's winners must decide on an action in order to put the objects that they acquire into productive use and the optimal choice of action depends on the true state of the world. In sharp contrast to previous findings, we show that such large common-value auctions have equilibria where the equilibrium price reveals no information about the state of the world. Hence, our result suggests that if information is useful for efficient decision making, then the equilibrium price may not aggregate all the information relevant for the decision. This stands in stark contrast to earlier studies which show that prices aggregate information if there is no immediate use of this information.
To fix ideas, consider the following two examples: First, suppose that a large tract of land is to be divided and sold to farmers in smaller parcels through a uniform-price auction. The farmers, who participate in the auction, are not wealthy enough to afford multiple parcels. Each farmer, who successfully acquires a parcel of land in the auction, needs to decide which crop to grow (e.g. wheat or rice). However, there is uncertainty about the future crop prices as well as which crop grows best on the land. Second, consider a uniform-price auction where bandwidth is sold to global telecommunication companies. Each winner must decide whether to use the conventional technology or adopt an unconventional new one. However, there is uncertainty about future demand characteristics (such as customer tastes) which will determine which technology is more profitable.
In both of these examples, the winner of an object in the auction (a piece of land in the first and bandwidth in the second) must choose an action which will effect the value the winner derives from the object. Moreover, this action must be taken after the auction is finalized but before some payoff relevant uncertainty is resolved. Consequently, if the auction price provides additional information that reduces uncertainty, i.e., if the auction price aggregates information, then the winners would make better decisions when choosing their action (i.e., which crop to grow or which technology to adopt).
Motivated by these examples, we study a market where k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n > k bidders each demand one unit of the good.
Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world. In the auction, bidders choose their bids as a function of their signal, the k highest bidders are allocated one unit of the object, and all bidders who win an object pay a uniform price equal to the k + 1st highest bid. The good that is auctioned is a common-value object for the bidders and a bidder's valuation for the object is determined jointly by the state of the world and an action that he chooses after winning the object but before he observes the state. In a large market, if the market clearing price were to aggregate all information, then actions would be chosen efficiently and competition would necessarily drive the price of the object to its efficient-use value.
We explore a number of properties of the markets when the numbers of bidders and the objects grow proportionately, however, our primary focus is on the informativeness of prices. An outsider, who could observe the signals of an arbitrarily large number of bidders, would learn the state of the world perfectly. Motivated by such an outsider's perspective, we say that prices fully aggregate information if an outsider can figure out the state of the world almost perfectly just by observing the equilibrium price of a large market.
We present two main results: In our first main result, we construct a particular sequence of symmetric equilibria where the equilibrium prices converge to a price that conveys no information about the true state of the world as market grows large. In the equilibria we construct, prices remain suppressed and consequently bidders make strictly positive profits despite the relative scarcity of objects. Also, because prices do not aggregate information, agents have strict incentives to acquire costly information both before they participate in the market and after the objects are allocated.
Moreover, we show that such a sequence of equilibria can be constructed for a generic set of parameter values.
A prominent property of the equilibrium we construct is that equilibrium bids are nondecreasing in the signal that an agent receives, i.e., the bidding function is monotone nondecreasing. In order to explore the robustness of this first result, we then study arbitrary symmetric equilibria where the bidding function is monotone. In our second result, we characterize equilibrium behavior in any symmetric equilibrium where the bidding function is monotone and we use this characterization to show that no sequence of such equilibria can fully aggregate information. In any symmetric equilibria where the bidding function is monotone, prices remain below the efficient use value of the object and prices fail to aggregate information.
To understand the logic of our findings, it is useful to further discuss the particular monotone equilibrium that we construct. In this equilibrium, bidders face two countervailing incentives that jointly determine equilibrium bids and thus equilibrium prices. The first is an incentive to compete:
If a bidder makes strictly positive profits when he wins an object at a price equal to his bid, then he prefers to increase his bid. The second is an incentive to learn: information is dispersed among the bidders and therefore bidders have an incentive to learn about the signal distribution using their bids.
In particular, in the equilibrium that we construct, there is a pooling bid. For a bidder who chooses the pooling bid, when the price is the pooling bid, "winning" and "losing" is an extra piece of information pertaining to the state of the world. If instead such a bidder chooses a bid that exceeds the pooling bid and if the price is equal to the pooling bid, then this bidder wins an object but does not observe what would have happened had she chosen the pooling bid, i.e., she does not receive that extra piece of information. Specifically, when the price is equal to the pooling bid, objects are allocated using rationing among the bid who choose the pooling bid. The bidders, who choose the pooling bid and win an object under rationing, obtain an extra piece of information about the state of the world because winning an object is more likely in one state than the other.
In other words, rationing is a lottery whose odds depend on the state of the world. If a bidder who chooses the pooling bid increases his bid, then he acquires an object with higher frequency because he avoids rationing. However, in this case he foregoes the extra piece of information that comes from winning under rationing. This extra piece of information is sufficiently valuable for the bidders who choose the pooling bid and these bidders refrain from increasing their bid even though they make strictly positive profits at the pooling bid. An immediate consequence of having a pooling bid is that bidders with different signals may submit the same bids, making the equilibrium price less sensitive to the information of the bidders. A consequence of such limited learning is that there is always a non negligible fraction of winners who choose the wrong action in this equilibrium.
More intuitively, it is exactly the positive value of information at the action stage, which takes place after the objects are allocated, that prevents the competitive forces from pushing the price to the efficient use value of the object. Given that prices conceal some information, the incentive to learn remains significant, and thus pooling is sustained as part of equilibria. In turn, given that pooling is sustained in equilibrium, prices do indeed conceal some information. This intuition is also what precludes equilibrium pooling in auctions where there are no ex-post actions: because there is no ex-post action, i.e., because there is no value for information once the auction is complete, the incentive to compete cannot be overcome by the incentive to learn and thus competition always breaks pooling.
In the paper, we also characterize all symmetric equilibria that are monotone and we argue that these equilibria are qualitatively similar to the particular equilibrium that we discussed above. More specifically, we show that in all weakly increasing equilibria, players who receive low signals choose a pooling bid, players who receive high signals bid above the pooling bid, and the bidding function is strictly increasing above the pooling bid. Moreover, we show that prices can never fully aggregate information in monotone equilibria: Prices either do not reveal any information about the state of the world, or there is price indeterminacy, i.e., prices are random even conditional on the state of the world.
In a nutshell, our results suggest that price by itself may not be a very good aggregator of information, if it is used to make decisions that affect the value of the objects. Market statistics other than price, such as, the amount of rationing, volume and bid distributions may be informative, and whether they are announced or not may affect the information aggregation ability of prices. 1
Moreover, dynamic models where traders engage in multiple rounds of activities may augment the accumulation of useful information.
Relation to literature. The earlier papers that study markets with strategic traders using an auction mechanism are Wilson (1977) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) . The former paper studies second price auctions with common value for one object for sale and the latter extends the analysis to any arbitrary number, k, of objects. Both papers show that as the number of bidders, n, gets arbitrarily large, price converges to the true value of the object, but only provided that there exist bidders with arbitrarily strong conviction about the state of the world.
The closest paper to ours, Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) , argue that if there are no arbitrarily informative signals, then prices converge to the true values in all symmetric equilibria if and only if both k and n − k grow without bound. Our main departure from their model is that the object's value is jointly determined by the unknown state of the world and the action that the owner of the object takes. Kremer (2002) shows that the information aggregation properties of auctions is more general than the particular mechanisms studied before by providing a unified approach that uses the statistical properties of certain order statistics. Hong and Shum (2004) finds the convergence rate of prices to the true value. Jackson and Kremer (2007) show that the results of Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) do not generalize once there are individualized prices, i.e., when one considers discriminatory auctions.
There are a number of papers that show that prices in double auctions also aggregate information and therefore allocate objects efficiently. Most notable are Reny and Perry (2006) and Cripps and Swinkels (2006) . The former allows for interdependent values whereas the latter studies private value environments.
There is also a literature on information aggregation properties of markets where the objects are divisible. Vives (2011) studies competitive supply schedule games, and show that as the number of firms get large, equilibrium behavior converges to price-taking behavior. Rostek and Weretka (2010) studies a similar model that allows for heterogeneity in traders' private information, and show that interdependent values may cause a nonmonotonicity in the price informativeness with respect to market size. See also Vives (2008) for a more extensive survey of this literature.
Another related literature studies whether prices in economies where agents need to match in order to engage in a trade converges to Walrasian prices as the search frictions disappear.
The environment these papers study are dynamic, and learning and trading happens over time.
Some of the classical papers are Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) , Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) and Osborne and Rubinstein (2010) covers an extensive survey of this literature. More recently, Lauermann and Wolinsky (2011) studied a search model where a seller looks for a buyer who observes a private signal about the value of the object, and argue that equilibrium prices depend critically on the tail properties of the signal distributions. Lauermann (2007) provides a unified approach for understanding when search markets with disappearing frictions exhibit Walrasian outcomes. In the context of financial markets, Golosov et al. (2011) show that experimenting with small offers for divisible goods achieve information aggregation and efficient allocations. Ostrovsky (2009) shows that trading 'seperable' securities in a dynamic environment allows information that is dispersed among the traders to get aggregated.
The model that we consider is also related to the model analyzed by Bond and Eraslan (2010) . Bond and Eraslan (2010) show that trade is possible between two agents with the same preferences if the value of the object, which is traded, is jointly determined by an unknown state of the world and an ex-post action that the eventual owner of the object will undertake. In their model, trade is precluded by a no-trade theorem without an ex-post action. The ex-post action and the consequent value of information leads to the possibility of trade.
Rationing in equilibrium is a distinct feature of our model. Equilibrium rationing also occurs in certain credit markets models. For example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that rationing is an equilibrium phenomena in credit markets if there is either adverse selection or moral hazard. In this paper, equilibrium interest rates remain depressed even though they do not clear the credit market. Rates remain lower than what is needed to clear the market because either higher rates lead safer types to drop out from the demand pool or alternatively they result in more aggressive risk taking by the debtors. Also see the papers by Bester (1985 Bester ( , 1987 for why rationing disappears if the lenders can screen the borrowers with an additional instrument other than the interest rate.
In our model, there is also asymmetric information among the bidders however the seller has no preferences over who gets the objects. Thus in our setting rationing plays a different role: some buyers choose to be rationed in order to receive extra information about the state of the world.
Our work also relates to the literature on costly information acquisition in rational expectations models, such as Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) and Grossman (1981) . These papers explain the conceptual difficulties in interpreting prices as both allocation devices and information aggregators. Specifically, they argue that if consumers and producers need undertake a costly information acquisition activity, then equilibrium prices do not reveal the state of the world perfectly. This is because otherwise the agents who pay the cost of information would not have the incentives to get information at the first place, rendering information to be transmitted into the prices. These papers emphasize that the role of predicting the future state of the world is essential in making current economic decisions, but fail to address that such economic activities may amount to further than a formulation of how much to demand or how much to produce.
Model
We consider a sealed-bid, uniform-price auction. In this auction, there are n bidders with unit demand and k identical objects. We denote the ratio of objects to bidders, i.e., market tightness in this auction by κ := k n < 1. The set of states of the world is Ω := {L, R} and we denote a generic element of this set by ω. The state of the world is drawn according to a common prior π ∈ [0, 1], the prior probability that the state is R is π, and the prior probability that the state is L is 1 − π. The payoff of a bidder who does not win an object is equal zero. We assume that a bidder who wins the object must choose an action from a finite set of actions A. This action together with state of the world determines the winner's valuation for the good. Although all our arguments go through with an arbitrary finite number of actions, to keep exposition simple, we assume that A = {l, r}.
A winning bidder's payoff is jointly determined by the auction price p, the action that he chooses a ∈ A, and the state of the world. In particular, we assume that a winning bidder's payoff is equal to v(a, ω)− p where the function v(a, ω) gives the winner's valuation for the object. In what follows, we will make the following assumptions on the valuation function v:
In other words, the bidder's valuation for the good is positive if his action matches the state of the world and his valuation for the good is zero if his action does not match the state of the world.
Signals
The set of signals is S := [0, 1], and the bidders' signals are distributed iid conditional on the state of the world. Each bidder's signal distribution has a cumulative distribution function F (.|w) with a density function f (.|w) for each w ∈ Ω.
Since we only make the MLRP assumption in its weak form, our model is able to accommodate discrete signals. Moreover since we have only two states of the world, this condition corresponds to a reordering of the signals, and is without loss of generality.
Assumption 4 (Limited individual information) There exists a number η > 0 such that η < f (s|w) < In what follows, we refer to the m th highest value among n signals by Y m n . We define the unique signals s κ R ∈ S and s κ L ∈ S such that F (s κ R |R) = 1 − κ and F (s κ L |L) = 1 − κ. Recall that κ < 1 is the market tightness, i.e., the ratio of object to bidders. Intuitively, in a large market there are as many bidders with signals above s κ R as there are objects in state R. Therefore, if we were to allocate the objects to the bidders with higher signals first, then, in state R, the bidders who receive an object would be exactly those bidders whose signals exceed s κ R .
The value function
If a bidder believes that the probability of state R is p, then we say that the bidder's likelihood ratio for state R is ρ := p/(1 − p). Since the bidders have a common prior on the state of the world, and this prior assigns probability π to state R, their prior likelihood ratio for state R is ρ 0 := π/(1 − π). Below we introduce the value function u which gives a bidder's expected valuation for an object as a function of the likelihood ratio ρ. In particular, let u : [0, ∞] → R be the function defined by
This function gives the bidder's expected value for the object as a function of his beliefs about the state of the world. Note that u(0) = v(l, L) and lim ρ→∞ u(ρ) = v(r, R). Let ρ * ∈ (0, 1) be the unique solution to the following equation:
This cutoff is the likelihood ratio that makes a bidder indifferent between action l and r. For a bidder who receives signal s ∈ [0, 1], slightly abusing notation, we let Pr(s * |L) where Pr(s * |ω) denotes the probability of observing signal s * given that the state is ω ∈ {L, R}. The fact that ρ(s) is increasing in s implies that ρ(s, s * ) is also increasing in s. 
Suppose that the realization of the public signal is s
* = d. If Pr(d|R) Pr(d|L) < ρ * /ρ(1), or equivalenty, if ρ(1, d) < ρ * , then ρ(s, d) < ρ * for all s ∈ [0, 1]. This is because ρ(s) ≤ ρ(1) for all s ∈ [0, 1]. However, ρ(s, d) < ρ * for all s ∈ [0, 1] implies that the value function u(ρ(s, d)) is decreasing
Remark 2 In auctions where there is no ex-post action, the ordering of the bidders according to their valuation cannot change as a result of new information. 3 To demonstrate this point, we
ρ (0) ρ (1) initial range of beliefs 
Strategies and equilibrium
Each bidder submits a bid after observing her signal. A bidding strategy for player i is a measure
on its first coordinate (see Milgrom and Weber (1985) ). The set of all bidding strategies is Σ. A strategy is pure if there is a function b : Each winner chooses an action from the set of actions A. Hence, the action strategy is a mapping from a bidder's signal, his bid and the winning price to an action,
Since the bidders' actions do not affect other bidder's payoffs, confining attention to pure strategy actions is without loss.
Every bidding strategy profile, H := {H i } i∈{1,2,...,n} together with nature's choice of state and signals induces a joint probability distributionH on signals, prices and winners of the object. Let ρ i (s, b, p, win) denote the posterior likelihood of state R for bidder i who receives a signal s, when he bids b ≥ p and he wins a unit. Such a bidder's optimal action choice is r if
Figure 3: This figure shows both the range of initial beliefs and two examples of the range of beliefs that bidders could hold if they received an extra signal, d, which is an evidence that suggests the state is L. The signal d that the agents receive is more strongly in favor of L in (a) than in (b).
and l if ρ i (s, b, p, win) < ρ * . Moreover the continuation payoff of such a bidder is u(ρ i (s, b, p, win)).
The payoff to bidder i of the bidding strategy H i when the bidders other than i are following the strategy profile H −i is given by:
wins a unit)
A bidding strategy profile H is a Nash equilibrium if
In the rest of the paper, we will construct equilibria where bidders use pure bidding strategies.
We also restrict attention to pure symmetric Nash equilibria, which are equilibria where the each bidder uses the same pure bidding strategy, i.e., b i = b j for every two bidders i and j. The term Pr b denotes the probability distribution induced by the pure and symmetric bidding strategy profile where each bidder uses the bidding strategy b, over states of the world, signal and bid distribution, allocations and prices.
A pure bidding strategy is monotone increasing (decreasing) if it is weakly increasing (decreasing) in the signals. A pure symmetric Nash equilibrium is monotone if the bidding strategy is monotone.
Large Markets and the Failure of Information Aggregation
In this section we present our main result as Theorem 1. In Theorem 1, we constuct a sequence of equilibria for auctions {Γ n } ∞ n=1 where the n th auction Γ n has n bidders and ⌊κn⌋ objects for sale. 4 We assume that the other parameters of the auctions, i.e., (v, F, π, κ) , are constant along the sequence and satisfy all the assumptions that we have already made. For the sequence of equilibria we construct, equilibrium price reveals no information about the state of the world at the limit where there is an arbitrarily large number of bidders. Although the limit equilibrium price reveals no information, agents do learn some information about the state of the world through rationing.
However, the amount of information that they learn is limited and incorrect ex-post actions are played frequently.
Information aggregation.
Here we formally define information aggregation and its failure. Our object of study is a sequence of bidding functions b = {b n } ∞ n=m . We say that the sequence b is an equilibrium sequence if b n is part of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of Γ n for each n.
Suppose that the number of bidders n is large. In this case, the law of large numbers implies that observing the signals (s 1 , ..., s n ) conveys precise information about the state of the world ω ∈ {L, R}. The bidding function b n determines a price p * for the auction Γ n given any realization of signals (s 1 , ..., s n ). We say that information is aggregated in the auction if this price p * also conveys precise information about the state of the world. More precisely, (i) if the likelihood ratio
Pr bn (p * |L) is close to zero, i.e., if it is arbitrarily more probable that we observe such a price when ω = L, then an outsider who observes price p * learns that the state is L. Or (ii) if the likelihood ratio Pr bn (p * |R)
Pr bn (p * |L) is arbitrarily large, then an outsider who observes price p * learns that the state is R. If the probability that we observe a price that satisfies either (i) or (ii) is arbitrarily close to one, then we say that the equilibrium sequence b fully aggregates information. Conversely, if the likelihood ratio
Pr bn (p * |L) is close to one, i.e., if we are equally likely to observe price p * in either of the two states, then an outsider who observes price p * learns arbitrarily little information about the state of the world. If the probability that we observe such a price is arbitrarily close to one, then we say that the equilibrium sequence b aggregates no information. The precise definitions are as follows:
An equilibrium sequence b fully aggregates information if for any ǫ > 0 Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997 Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) .
Remark 3 Our definition of information aggregation differs from the definition provided by
3.2. Failure of information aggregation. Our main theorem shows that if, in addition to Assumptions 1-5, two conditions are satisfied, then there exists an equilibrium sequence b which aggregates no information. Recall that s κ R ∈ S is the signal such that F (s κ R |R) = 1 − κ. Our main theorem is as follows:
then there exists an equilibrium sequence b which reveals no information.
Proof: see Appendix.
We prove this theorem by constructing an equilibrium sequence which aggregates no information. In this construction, each bidding function b n in the equilibrium sequence b is a nondecreasing function of s. Before discussing this construction, we discuss the two conditions under which such an equilibrium sequence which reveals no information exists. 3.3. Sketch of the construction. In this section, we sketch the ideas behind constructing the equilibrium sequence b shown to exist in Theorem 1. Specifically, we construct an equilibrium, where no information is aggregated in a hypothetical market with a continuum of bidders with mass one and a continuum of object with mass κ. Focusing on a hypothetical market with a continuum of bidders, allows us to capture the main properties of the equilibrium sequence b for a market with a finite but large number of bidder while allowing us to avoid the more technical details involved in describing such equilibria for finite markets. In section 5.2, we discuss in detail how one can use the intuition developed here to construct the equilibrium sequence b for a sequence of finite markets.
Figure 4: This figure shows the initial range of beliefs, expressed as likelihood ratios, on the beliefvalue graph. Note that the bidder's who assign higher probability to state R, i.e., the bidder's with higher signals, are the bidders with higher value.
In order to simplify the exposition, we also assume that ρ(s) is a continuous, strictly increasing function of the signal s. Also, in what follows we repeatedly use the fact that the value function u(·) is strictly decreasing in the interval [0, ρ * ] and strictly increasing in the interval [ρ * , ∞).
We construct an equilibrium where the equilibrium bidding function, b, is constant on the interval [0, s p ) for some cutoff signal s p > s κ R which we calculate further below, i.e., b(s) = b p for all s ∈ [0, s p ), and the bidding function is strictly increasing on the interval (s p , 1]. We call the bid b p , i.e., the bid submitted by all bidders with signals in the interval [0, s p ), the pooling bid. See figure   5 for a depiction of the bidding function b.
In this equilibrium, (i) The auction price is equal to the pooling bid in either state of the world and hence it conveys no additional information about the state of the world. The auction price is always equal to the bidding price because s p > s κ R . The fact that s p exceeds s κ R implies that for any price p ′ > b p , the mass of bidder's who submit a bid greater than or equal to p ′ is strictly less than the mass of objects available, i.e., the measure of the set {s : b(s) ≥ p ′ } is strictly less than κ in both states.
(ii) Bidders with signals that exceed s p , i.e., those bidders whose bid exceeds the pooling price, are always allocated an object and choose action r. These bidders choose action r because they obtain no new information from the auction price and because choosing r is optimal based solely on their private signal.
(iii) Bidders with signals less than s p who are allocated an object, i.e., the bidders who bid the pooling price, take action l. Although the price conveys no information about the state, the fact that a bidder wins an object by bidding the pooling price is a strong signal favoring state L which induces that agent to choose action l. Winning an object by bidding the pooling price is a strong signal favoring state L because the mass of bidders bidding the pooling price exceeds the objects to be allocated to bidders bidding the pooling price. Moreover, a bidder is more likely to be allocated a good in state L than in state R. We discuss this issue in more detail below.
We now discuss how to calculate the cutoff signal s p . The cutoff signal s p is the signal which leaves a bidder indifferent between bidding the pooling bid and bidding slightly above the pooling bid. If a bidder bids above the pooling bid, then she wins an object with certainty. The posterior belief of a bidder who wins an object by bidding above the pooling bid is equal to his initial beliefs. This is because the auction price is always equal to the pooling bid in this equilibrium and conveys no information. Consequently, the expected value of the object to a bidder with signal s if he bids above the pooling bid is u (ρ(s)).
We now calculate the value of the object for a bidder who receives the cutoff signal s p if he bids the pooling bid and wins a unit, when s p > s κ R . In such an event, this bidder has an extra piece of information. This extra piece of information comes from the fact that he wins a unit while bidding the pooling bid. In particular, a fraction 1 − F (s p |ω) of bidders bid strictly above the pooling bid and each win an object with certainty regardless of the state. The fraction of objects that remain to be delivered to bidders who choose the pooling bid is κ − (1 − F (s p |ω) ). Since the number of objects remaining to be delivered is less than the number of bidders, there is rationing among the bidders at the pooling bid. Consequently, the belief of type s p (represented as the likelihood ratio) if he bids the pooling bid and wins the object is as follows
where the ratio ∆(s p ) :
reflects the extra information that a bidder learns from winning an object at the pooling bid. If a bidder with signal s p bids the pooling bid and wins the object, then the expected value of the object to him is equal to u (ρ p (s p )). Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) or Milgrom and Weber (1982) , the fact that ∆(s p ) < 1 is commonly referred to as the loser's curse. We now argue that there is a unique signal s > s κ R such that u (ρ(s)) = u (ρ p (s)), and we denote this signal by s p . In the following, let ρ p (s κ R ) = 0, and notice that ρ p (s)
. Let s * denote the unique signal such that ρ p (s * ) = ρ * and note that s * ∈ (s κ R , 1). The function u(ρ(s)) is strictly increasing in s and u(ρ(s)) > u(ρ * ) for all s. The function u(ρ(s)) is strictly increasing because ρ(s) > ρ * , by assumption, because ρ(s) is strictly increasing in s, and because u(ρ) is strictly increasing for any ρ ∈ (ρ * , ρ]. Also, the function u(ρ p (s)) is strictly decreasing in s for all s ∈ [s κ R , s * ], strictly increasing in s for all s ∈ [s * , 1], and reaches its minimum at u(ρ p (s * )) = u(ρ * ). Consequently, the two functions must cross at some point s p ∈ (s κ R , s * ). There is a unique such point, s p , because ρ p (s) = ρ(s)∆(s) < ρ(s) for all s ∈ [s κ R , 1). Also, see figure 7 for a depiction. We now argue that bidders with signals lower than s p cannot profitably deviate from the equilibrium by choosing a bid that exceeds the pooling bid. If a bidder with signal s < s p deviates and bids above the pooling bid, then she wins an object with certainty and pays the pooling bid b p = u(ρ(s p )). In this case her posterior and prior likelihood ratios coincide and are equal to ρ(s).
However, the fact that ρ * < ρ(s) < ρ(s p ) implies that u(ρ(s)) < b p = u(ρ(s p )), i.e., the auction price exceeds the expect valuation, conditional on winning, of the bidder with signal s. Also, see figure 8 for a depiction of this argument for the case of s = 0.
Similarly, a bidder with signal s > s p cannot profitably deviate from equilibrium by choosing the pooling bid. If the bidder sticks to the equilibrium strategy, then she wins an object with certainty and her payoff is equal to u(ρ(s))− b p , and this payoff is strictly positive. If instead she deviates and chooses the pooling bid, then, conditional on winning, her posterior is equal to ρ * (s) := ρ(s)∆(s p ).
Note that ρ p (s p ) < ρ * (s) < ρ(s). To see that this deviation is not profitable consider two cases: First, if ρ * (s) ≥ ρ * , then u(ρ * (s) < u(ρ(s)). This is because ρ * (s) = ρ(s)∆(s p ) < ρ(s) and because u(·) is
This is because ρ * (s) = ρ(s)∆(s p ) > ρ(s p ) and because u(·) is decreasing on [0, ρ * ]. Also see figure   8 for a depiction.
Loser's curse.
A novel feature of our equilibrium construction is the existence of a pooling bid, b p , which is chosen by agents who receive a signal in the interval [0, s p ]. In other words, in the equilibrium that we construct, there is an atom in the equilibrium bid distribution at b p . In sharp contrast, existence of a pooling bid, i.e., an atom in the equilibrium bid distribution, is not possible in the equilibria of the auctions models of Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) or Milgrom and Weber (1982) , where there is no ex-post action, even when the signal space is discrete. The existence of a pooling bid in our model and the impossibility of pooling in auctions without ex-post actions are both consequences of the loser's curse, i.e., the fact that the probability of winning an object at the pooling bid in state L is strictly higher than the probability of winning an object at the pooling bid in state R. Or equivalently, not winning an object when the price is the pooling bid if one bids the pooling bid is a signal in favor of state R.
In the previous section, we discussed the role of the loser's curse in sustaining our equilibrium construction. We now discuss how the loser's curse precludes a pooling bid in an auction where there is no ex-post action. An auction where there is no ex-post can be modeled in our framework 
Figure 7: This figure depicts the value of the object to the cutoff type as a function of the choice of the cutoff type. 
, and ρ * (1) = ρ(1)∆(s p ) (ii) if they bid above the pooling bid and win a unit at the pooling price. In this case, the bidders obtain no new information and their posterior and prior likelihood ratios coincide, i.e., their posterior likelihood ratios are also equal to ρ(0), ρ(s p ), and ρ(1). Bidders with signal 0 strictly prefer to bid at the pooling bid, those with signal s p are indifferent between bidding at the pooling bid or above, those with signal 1 strictly prefer to bid above the pooling bid. Note that the pooling bid satisfies the equality,
by restricting the actions available to the bidders to only one action, for example, taking A to equal {r}. In this case, u(ρ) is an increasing function of ρ and so u(ρ(s)) is also an increasing function of s. Consider again the equilibrium which we discussed in the previous section. In that construction, the bidding function is weakly increasing in the signals, i.e., b(s) ≥ b(s ′ ) whenever s ≥ s ′ . Moreover, all bidders with a signal s < s p choose the pooling bid b p . We now argue that such an equilibrium is not possible because of the loser's curse. If a bidder with signal s < s p chooses the pooling bid, then, conditional on winning an object, her payoff is equal to u(ρ(s)∆(s p )) − b p .
If instead she deviates and bids above the pooling bid, then she wins an object with certainty and pays the pooling bid b p . In this case, her posterior is equal to ρ(s) and consequently her payoff, if she deviates, is equal to u(ρ(s)) − b p . However, the loser's curse, i.e., ∆(s p ) < 1, implies that ρ(s)∆(s p ) < ρ(s) and hence u(ρ(s)∆(s p )) < u(ρ(s)). Therefore, this is a profitable deviation as long as u(ρ(s)∆(s p )) ≥ b p , showing that this cannot be an equilibrium.
Intuitively, not winning an object at the pooling bid, when the auction price is equal to the pooling bid, is a strong signal in favor of state R. Therefore, a bidder would rather increase his bid slightly and ensure that he wins an object whenever the auction price is equal to the pooling price. Following this intuition, Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) shows that there is no symmetric equilibrium where there is an atom (or pooling) in the bid distribution if there is no ex-post action.
Properties of Equilibrium.
There are a number of novel properties of the equilibrium that we constructed for Theorem 1. In particular, in the equilibrium that we constructed the properties listed below are satisfied as the number of bidders grow arbitrarily large. Note that none of these properties are valid in a standard auction where there are no ex-post actions.
(i) No information aggregation: the equilibrium price aggregates no information even when the market grows arbitrarily large. We already discussed the intuition behind this property in the preceding section.
(ii) Learning from one's own bid: The posterior beliefs of the bidders who win an object depend on their bid. In particular, the posterior beliefs of the bidders who win an object by bidding above the pooling bid is equal to their prior belief. This is because the auction price reveals no information. In contrast, the posterior likelihood ratio of bidders who win an object by bidding the pooling bid is equal to their prior belief, ρ(s), multiplied by the constant ∆(s p ) ∈ (0, 1). Hence, a bidder's bid may affect the information he will have if he wins a unit. irrespective of the state of the world, all agents who win an object at the pooling bid choose action l and all other agents who win an object choose action r. Consequently, the proportion of agents choosing the wrong action is equal to 1 − F (s p |L) and κ − (1 − F (s p |R)) when the state is equal to L and R, respectively. Note that total expected surplus in the equilibrium that we construct is equal to the expression given below
Because ρ(0) > π * , by assumption, the equilibrium surplus is strictly decreasing in s p .
(iv) Positive profits: The expected profit of each bidders, except the bidder who receives signal s p , is strictly positive profits in equilibrium. Even though the equilibrium price is equal to the pooling bid, the bidders who submit the pooling bid also make positive profits. In particular,
Note that Π(s p ) = 0 by construction, Π(s) > 0 for all s < s p and also Π(s) > 0 for all s > s p .
(v) Valuable information: The value of information, i.e., the value of receiving a signal, is strictly positive for the bidders. This is because winning an object at the pooling bid is only partially informative and the equilibrium price is uninformative while, on the other hand, signals provide partial information about state as a consequence of Assumption 5.
Information Aggregation Failures in Monotone Equilibria
In the previous section, we described equilibria where no information is aggregated by the price while discussing Theorem 1. A prominent property of the equilibrium we described is that equilibrium bids are nondecreasing in the signal that an agent receives, i.e., the bidding function is monotone nondecreasing. In this section, in order to demonstrate the robustness of Theorem 1, we characterize all symmetric equilibria in which agent bids are determined by a monotone function of signals (Lemma 1). We then use our characterization to show that information cannot be fully aggregated in equilibria where the bidding function is monotone (Theorem 2). Finally, we show that equilibria, where the bidding function is monotone, exist under a mildly restrictive condition (Theorem 3). Consequently, our results in this section show that the failure of information aggregation is inherent in equilibria where the bidding function is monotone and moreover such equilibria exist for a wide range of parameter values.
Recall that our object of study is a sequence of equilibrium bidding functions b = {b n } ∞ n=m . We say that a bidding function is nondecreasing (nonincreasing) if b(s) is a nondecreasing (nonincreasing) function of s and we say that a bidding function is monotone if it is either nondecreasing or nonincreasing. We say that an equilibrium sequence b is nondecreasing (nonincreasing) if b n is part of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of Γ n and if b n is a nondecreasing (nonincreasing) bidding function for each n. We say that a sequence b is monotone if the sequence is nondecreasing or nonincreasing.
We begin by characterizing nondecreasing equilibrium bidding functions. 6 6 An obvious modification of the lemma delivers a characterization of all nonincreasing equilibrium bidding functions as well. Proof: see Appendix.
The characterization lemma essentially states that any nondecreasing equilibrium resembles the equilibrium that we constructed in the previous section for Theorem 1. More specifically, Lemma 1 shows that in any nondecreasing equilibrium there is at most one interval, which includes zero, over which the bidding function is constant and equal to the pooling bid, and the bidding function is strictly increasing outside of this interval. Moreover, on the equilibrium path, the bidders who submit the pooling bid choose action l and the bidders who submit a bid that exceeds the pooling bid always choose action r in the event that they win an object. Below we provide an intuitive sketch of the argument for the characterization of nondecreasing equilibria when the auction is large, although the lemma is true for every market size. We focus on a large auction while providing intuition because we later use this characterization to argue that information is not fully aggregated in any monotone equilibrium of a large auction.
− There must be pooling in any monotone equilibrium. Assume not, i.e., assume that the bidding function is strictly increasing. Consider a bidder who receives the signal zero. If this bidder's bid is equal to the auction price, then it must be the case that this bidder is almost certain that the state is L if the auction is sufficiently large. By a continuity argument, this is also true for a bidder who receives signal ǫ > 0 for ǫ sufficiently close to zero. But then a bidder would receives signal zero must be willing to submit a bid that is greater than a bidder who receives signal ǫ because the bidder with signal zero is more convinced that the state is L than the bidder with signal ǫ. This, however, contradicts that the bidding function is strictly increasing. − Bidders who bid a pooling bid choose action l if they win an object. Assume not, i.e., suppose that there is a bidder who bids the pooling bid and chooses action r if he wins an object. Notice he wins an object only when the auction price is not more than the pooling bid. Moreover, when the price is equal to the pooling bid, there is rationing with strictly positive probability. When the price is equal to the pooling bid, losing a unit is a signal more favorable to state R because of the loser's curse. Instead, if this bidder deviates from such a strategy by increasings his bid slightly, he ensures that he wins an object when the auction price is equal to the pooling price. Such a deviation is profitable, because such a bidder was playing r when he won an object by bidding the pooling bid, and now the deviation lets him win an object at those instances when he was losing by bidding the pooling bid. − There is only one pooling bid. If the bidders who are bidding a pooling bid choose action l when they win an object at the price equal to the pooling bid, then they also choose action l if the price is lower than the pooling bid. Therefore, all types who are bidding below the pooling bid also choose action l, because such bidders have lower signals, since the bidders are using nondecreasing bidding strategies. However, then type zero values the object the most among all bidders who are bidding at most a pooling bid. Therefore, all pooling bids are bid by type zero, and there is only one pooling bid. − Agents who submit bids that exceed the pooling bid choose action r if they win an object. Recall that s p is the highest signal for which b(s p ) equals the pooling bid. Pick a signal s ′ greater than but arbitrarily close to s p . Assume that a bidder who receives signal s ′ plays l if he wins an object and the auction price is equal to the pooling bid. We now argue that this assumption leads to a contradiction. A bidder who receives signal s ′ prefers submitting a bid that exceeds the pooling bid to submitting the pooling bid because s ′ > s p . Now consider the bidder who receives signal zero. Suppose that this bidder deviates and submits a bid that exceeds the pooling bid by an arbitrarily small amount and wins an object at the pooling price. In this event, the posterior of a bidder with signal zero puts more weight on state l than the posterior of a bidder with signal s ′ . Therefore, if the bidder who receives signal s ′ prefers to submit a bid that exceeds the pooling bid, then so does a bidder who receives signal zero. However, this contradicts the fact that type zero submits the pooling bid.
We now use the characterization in Lemma 1 to provide intuition for why information is not fully aggregated in nondecreasing equilibria. The argument essentially shows that, in an arbitrarily large market, the cutoff bid s p is sufficiently large and therefore the price is equal to the pooling bid with probability one in state L and with strictly positive probability in state R. Suppose that in an auction with n bidders and nκ objects, the equilibrium bidding function is nondecreasing. Below we define the posterior likelihood ratio, for a bidder who receives signal s, if she wins an object and the auction price is equal to b(s ′ ) where b(s ′ ) > b p :
where the function g(t) := t (1−κ) (1 − t) κ . In words, the bidder's posterior likelihood is calculated in the event where she receives signal s, another bidder receives a signal s ′ , there are nκ − 1 other bidders who receive signals that exceed s ′ , and there n − nκ − 1 other bidders who receive signals less than s ′ . Let s c denote the unique signal s ′ such that g(F (s ′ |R)) = g(F (s ′ |L)). See Figure 9 for a Figure 9 : In this figure, g(t) := t (1−κ) (1 − t) κ and s c is the unique signal s ′ such that g(F (s ′ |R)) = g(F (s ′ |L)). The function g(t) is concave and is maximized at t * = 1 − κ. Recall that s κ L and s κ R are the unique signals such that F (s κ L |L) = 1 − κ and F (s κ R |R) = 1 − κ. Note that the MLRP implies that s κ L < s κ R . Also, concavity of the function g implies that Figure 9 ) and consequently ρ n (p = b(s ′ ), s) converges to zero as n grows large. 7 We now provide the basic intuition behind the argument that establishes that information cannot be fully aggregated in a large auction: − In state L, the probability that the auction price is equal to the pooling bid approaches one as the auction grows arbitrarily large. Note that, because of the law of large numbers, if F (s p |L) > 1− κ, i.e., if the expected proportion of bidders who choose the pooling bid in state L exceeds 1−κ, then the price is equal to the pooling bid with probability one. Assume that F (s p |L) ≤ 1 − κ. This implies that s p < s c . However, this contradicts that a bidder, who submits a bid that exceeds the pooling bid, plays r when they win an object at the pooling bid. This is because, s p < s c implies that, ρ n (p = b(s p ), s) converges to zero as n grows large, i.e., their posterior probability that the state is R converges to zero, as the market grow large. − The auction price is equal the pooling bid with strictly positive probability when the state is R. Moreover, this probability is bounded strictly away from zero even as the number of bidders grows arbitrarily large. If this were not the case, then nobody would be willing to choose action r when the price is equal to the pooling bid. However, we know from the characterization lemma that all the bidders who submit play r when they win an object at the pooling bid. − Therefore, an outside observer is uncertain about the state when she observes that the auction price is equal to the pooling bid. Moreover, this event occurs with strictly positive probability.
In the theorem below, we summarize our finding that monotone equilibria cannot fully aggregate
) and consequently ρ(p = b(s ′ ), s, n) converges to infinity as n grows large. 
Let s c ∈ (0, 1) be the unique signal such that
We will now argue that for ∀ε > 0 there exists a Z ε such that s 
Hence, the pooling price becomes the price with probability one conditional on the state of the world L and a non negligible probability conditional on the state of the world R. Therefore the pooling price doesn't reveal the state of the world with a strictly positive probability in the limit as z → ∞.
Existence
In the next theorem we show that, if ρ(0) > ρ * , then there exists a market size Z such that for every z > Z, an nondecreasing equilibrium bidding function exists. Similarly, if ρ(1) < ρ * , then there exists a market size Z 2 such that for every z > Z 2 , a decreasing equilibrium bidding function exists. The restriction on the set of parameters has the following interpretation, when here are only two actions: ex-ante, all types would have undertaken the same action if they were given the object without participating in the auction and receiving further information.
then a nondecreasing (non increasing) equilibrium sequence b exists.
Indeterminacy of Prices and Low Prices
In monotone equilibria, the price is the pooling bid in state L with probability approaching one. If in state R, the probability that the price is the pooling bid approaches one, then the price reveals no information about the state of the world. If this probability does not approach one, then the price is the pooling bid in state R with a strictly positive probability. Note that the lowest bid above the pooling bid gets arbitrarily close to v(r, R), because s p > s c . Therefore, if prices reveal some information, then they are either the pooling bid, or v(r, R) in state R. Therefore prices are indeterminate even conditional on the state of the world.
The pooling bid is certainly not more than v(l, L). If v(l, L) < v(r, R), then the price of the object is strictly less than its efficient use value with a strictly positive probability in state R.
Discussion

Auctions without Actions vs. Auctions with Actions
In this subsection, we explore why information is aggregated in the model of Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) and why it is not in auctions with actions. Now suppose that v(l, L) = 0, and hence action l is weakly dominated by action r, and essentially the model coincides with P-S model with two states of the world Ω = {L, R} and the value of the object is zero in state L and v(r,R) in state R. Also assume that there are k objects and n > k bidders. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of this model, the bidding function is the following:
for every s ∈ (0, 1). This function is strictly increasing in s, even if the signal distribution satisfies weak MLRP and not strict MLRP (see also Figure 10 ). Now consider the cutoff signal s c ∈ (0, 1) that is the unique interior solution to the following equation: 8
If we keep κ = k n constant and let n go to ∞, then for every s < s c , Pr(ω = R|s 1 = s, Y k n−1 = s) goes to zero, and for every s > s c , Pr(ω = R|s 1 = s, Y k n−1 = s) goes to one. Therefore bids go to zero for signals smaller than s c and v(r, R) for signals higher than s c . Since the type s c wins an object in state L and loses in state R, prices go to zero and v(r, R) in states L and R when n goes to ∞. Since prices are different in each state of the world, price reveals the state of the world.
When v(l, L) > 0, then as we show in our characterization lemma, all types who bid strictly above the pooling bid take action r at any price. We first look at types who are arbitrarily close to the cutoff signal s p and bidding above the pooling bid b p . Since they are taking action r at prices close to their bids, we get
Therefore, for every ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large, it has to be that s p is at least s c − ǫ. Therefore, 8 The uniqueness follows from the following: the assumption that signals are not completely uninformative, and weak MLRP together imply that for any s ∈ (0, 1), F (s c |L) > F (s c |R). The function t(q) = q 1−κ (1 − q) κ is single peaked and has a maximum at q = 1 − κ. Therefore the solution is unique. price becomes the pooling bid in state L with probability close to one when n is sufficiently large.
On the other hand, types close to but above s p take action r also when the price is b p . Therefore when n is large, it must be that price is the pooling bid with a non-vanishing probability when the state is R. Therefore, the pooling bid doesn't reveal the state of the world even when the market is very large. The equilibrium price distribution becomes concentrated on two points, one of them is the pooling bid and the other one is v(r, R), as in figure 10.
Sketch of Construction with Finite Markets
In tho subsection, we also assume that f (.|R) and f (.|L) are continuous functions. For every market size z, we first find a cutoff signal 
Remark 5 Note that 
Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the role of market prices for aggregating information about the correct use of objects. In our set up, multiple homogenous goods are allocated among multiple bidders via a Vickrey-type auction. Our main finding is that, when prices contain information about the post actions that the owners of the object will take, then prices may not reveal all information available in the market. In the extreme case, prices reveal no information about the state of the world, and a non-negligible fraction of the objects are used incorrectly.
There are trivial mechanisms that could aggregate information. In our model, there is no room for allocative inefficiency. Therefore, a direct mechanism that elicits the signals of bidders, and allocates the objects randomly, and discloses the signal profile achieves full efficiency. However, we study Vickrey auctions for four main reasons. First, such auctions are frequently used in practice.
The treasury bill auctions is a prominent example. Second, such auctions resemble competitive markets where agents are price takers. In a Vickrey auction, a bidder cannot change the price he pays for the object by altering his bid. This property is reminiscent of price taking behavior. Third, as in competitive markets there is a uniform price. Fourth, there is a large body of academic work that studies Vickrey auctions. Therefore, it is in and of itself useful to know how such auctions perform when the objects have a use value which depends on ex-post actions.
We interpret our results as suggesting that it may be too much to expect prices to reveal the state of the world perfectly. Markets have several other statistics than price, such as amount of rationing, volume or bid distributions that may be relevant for aggregating information. The two claims are proven in the same way so we prove only the first one. We remind that, the informative signal assumption is assumed to hold, and hence f (0|L) = f (0|R).
A.1. Method used for the construction The construction has two general steps. In the first step, we show that in a large market with size z, there exists a cutoff signal, s p z such that in a monotone bidding profile b z where all types below s p z bid a pooling bid, the following two properties are satisfied. i) the value of the object to bidders with signals s < s p z , who win a unit by bidding the pooling bid, is not less than the value of the object to such bidders if they win a unit by bidding above the pooling bid, and when the price is the pooling bid. ii) The value of the object to bidders 9 More precisely, this contradicts that
with signals s > s p z when they bid above the pooling bid and the price is the pooling bid is not less than if such bidders bid the pooling bid and win a unit. In this step, we also determine the value of the pooling bid. The second step of the construction shows that the bidding profile constructed in step 1 is an equilibrium of the auction game. We do this by showing that no type has a profitable deviation from the bidding profile constructed in step 1.
A.2.
Step 1: Cutoff type For any s ∈ (0, 1), s ′ ∈ S and z ∈ Z, let ρ − z (s ′ , s) and
The event that "1 wins the lottery" corresponds to the event that 1 wins a prize (or equivalently one unit of the object) in the following auxiliary lottery whose odds depend on the signal distribution across the bidders. The lottery has q prizes allocated equally likely to o people, where the number of prizes q = max {0, κz − |j ∈ {2, ..., z} : s j > s|} and the number of people is o = 1 + |j ∈ {2, ..., z} : price being b p and they winning the object. Since this value is strictly less than the value when the price is strictly lower than b p , these types make strictly positive profits when the price is strictly less than b p . And finally, the bid of s ′′ cannot be an atom because the value of the object conditional on losing when the price is her bid is strictly larger than the value if the price was strictly above her bid but not higher than b p , which contradicts her bid being an atom (This is a completely symmetric argument as lemma 5 Step 4: Now we consider bids above b p and will show that
Since we have shown that there can be at most one atom, b does not have a constant part above s p . Therefore, it should be that ρ(s 1 = s p , p = b p ) > ρ * . This follows from monotonicity of b and the winner's curse. The reason is that otherwise signals lower and arbitrarily close to s p would have a provitable deviation to bid above b p (see PS page 1272 again). Moreover ρ(s 1 = s, p = b(s ′ )) > ρ * for s, s ′ > s p from Weak MLRP.
We now conclude that b has to be a la PS above s p , i.e., for s > s p , b(s) = u(ρ(s 1 = s, Y k n−1 = s)). This follows from Pesendorfer and Swinkels, because the value of the object is strictly increasing in the probability that the bidder assigns to state R for types above s p .
D. Miscallenous Results
Lemma 3 There is a unique signal s * which is a limit point of the cutoffs {s κ−(1−F (s|L))) , u(ρ(s)) − u(ρ(s)) < (>)0 for s < s * (s > s * ).
Proof: Let s * be a limit point of the sequence, and rename the original sequence so that the limit is s * . We have proven that s * ≥ s κ R in claim 1 of proof of theorem 3. So now assume that
If s κ R is a limit point of the sequence, then it should be that, for every s > s κ R , ∆(s) < 0. However, then no s > s κ R can be a limit point since this contradicts the previous finding that for a signal s to be a limit point, it has to be that for signals s ′ ∈ (s κ R , s), ∆(s) > 0. Hence we have shown that if s κ R is a limit point, then it is the unique limit point, and if it is not, and if an s > s κ R is a limit point, then it is unique. This completes the argument that the sequence has a unique limit point.
Lemma 4 If f (0|L) = f (0|R), then ρ − z (s) > ρ + z (s) for any s ∈ (0, 1). Moreover both of these functions are strictly increasing in s.
Proof: The first claim in this lemma is identical to the argument in PS page 1272 and is called loser's curse. The claim that ρ + z (s) and ρ − z (s) are strictly increasing is very standard, and we therefore skip the proof. 
Explanation: The probability that 1 wins with b p , the price is b p conditional on ω can be calculated as the sum of the probabilities of winning in each of the following events, w i,j where i ≤ k − 1 bidders bid above s ′′ , and k − i ≤ j ≤ n − 1 − i bidders bid the pooling bid. The probability of winning conditional on event w i,j is k−i j+1 , since there are k − i objects remaining for the j + 1 bidders bidding the pooling bid. The above expressions calculate the probability of each event w i,j in each state and calculate the total winning probability in each state.
Similarly the term f (ω = L|s 1 = s) Pr(ω = L|Y k n−1 = s ′ ) is calculated using the following steps: 
We make the following notation before we proceed:
We first present the following identity, which require minor algebra: 
We first observe the following inequality:
Our second observation is that for any fixed u ∈ {0, ..., n − k − 1}, the term (k−i)!(n−k−1)! (k−i+u+1)!(n−k−u−1)! is strictly increasing in i.
Our third observation is the following inequality that holds for any u: Our final observation is that
is strictly increasing in i, which also follows from MLRP assumption, and a simple calculation.
These four observations yield the desired result.
